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1 Introduction
Do stock listings and the subsequent information aggregation in equity prices constitute
a stock pricebased monitoring channel and contribute to better investment quality? The
economic literature has extensively discussed governance benets of stock listings (and cross-listings)
in terms of their impact on the legal and shareholder environment, which in turn a¤ects how
resources are allocated within a rm.1 Yet the very role of the stock price itself in determining
corporate investment remains controversial. Do managers base capital budgeting decisions on
private information and ignore stock prices?2 Or do stock prices play an important role in
coordinating investment decisions across rms and sectors by channeling capital to its most
protable use after adjusting for risk? Prior empirical research could not reach a denite
answer on this issue because of the di¢ culty in identifying exogenous mispricing events that
can reliably test for the independent role of stock prices in corporate investment.3
This paper argues that the 20072009 nancial crisis provides a natural experiment with
large-scale stock mispricing that can render clear evidence of a causal e¤ect of stock prices
on corporate investment. Using global fund ownership data, we nd a large sample of US
stocks exposed to re sales by distressed equity funds. These distressed funds are identied
as having had large investment losses in bank stocks and, therefore, having experienced high
fund redemptions. Nonnancial stocks with high ownership by distressed equity funds were
1For a recent discussion of how cross-listings can constrain the private consumption of control benets, see
Doidge et al. (2009). Ferreira and Matos (2008) provide evidence that institutional owners in particular limit
corporate overinvestment by large rms and improve their operating performance.
2See Blanchard, Rhee, and Summers (1993), who refer to the stock market as a sideshow.See also Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990).
3Supporting evidence on the role of stock prices in investment is provided by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler
(2003) as well as Goyal and Yamada (2004). Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) and Blanchard, Rhee, and
Summers (1993) argue that the capital allocation role played by stock prices is only modest. Recent work by
Bakke and Whited (2010) nds no evidence that corporate investment responds to stock mispricing.
substantially underpriced relative to industry peers with nondistressed fund owners. In the
absence of systematic investment bias by distressed funds in their portfolio of nonnancial
stocks, fundsre sale behavior represents an exogenous treatment e¤ect and, therefore, provides
a robust way to test for the causal e¤ect of stock prices on the allocation of real resources.
We nd that stock underpricing had a powerful causal e¤ect on both investment and
employment in the 20072009 crisis. On average, stocks subject to re sales were underpriced
by 37%, and they simultaneously reduced quarterly investment in 2008/4 and 2009/1 by an
additional 20% compared with industry peers; the employment of these underpriced rms also
incrementally decreased by 4:7 percentage points (pps) in 2009 relative to industry peers.4 Our
further analysis focuses on the role of external nance in the dependence of real investments on
stock valuation. Using the Hadlock and Pierce index of nancial constraints (the AS index),
we sort stocks into a top tercile of nancially most constrained rms and a bottom tercile of
least constrained rms.5 We nd that the former group accounts for most of the strong decline
in the investment share among underpriced stocks. By contrast, the 33% least constrained
rms do not reduce their own investment relative to industry peers even when their stocks are
severely underpriced. This nding suggests that external nancial constraints play a key role in
the causal e¤ect of stock prices on investment. A direct stock pricebased monitoring channel
operates through the availability of external nance mostly a¤ecting small and nancially
4Hau and Lai (2012) show that the stock price for the 30% most exposed US stocks under-performed relative
to non-exposed industry peers by 37% at the peak of the stock market downturn, a result based on the regression
analysis of the cumulative weekly risk-adjusted excess returns (from June 29, 2007 to Feb. 27, 2007) for all
US stocks on a stock exposure dummy (marking the 30% most exposed US stocks). The regression carefully
controls for the di¤erent level of fund ownership for each stock as well as industry xed e¤ects.
5Hadlock and Pierce (2010) collect detailed qualitative information from nancial lings and subject various
proxies of nancial constraints to a rigorous test. They nd that only rm size and age are robust and su¢ ciently




Any welfare interpretation of the nding on the stock pricebased monitoring depends on the
degree of market e¢ ciency and the pervasiveness of agency problems in corporate investment.6
Any direct allocation role of stock prices implies distortion of the investment process whenever
stock prices are ine¢ cient. Such a distortion in investment concerns not only stock underpricing
(as in our natural experiment), but also stock overpricing. For example, Gilchrist et al.
(2005) and Polk and Sapienza (2009) provide evidence that managers actively caterto market
sentiment by investing more at ine¢ ciently high stock prices. However, if corporate agency
problems a¤ect investment e¢ ciency, then even a less than fully e¢ cient stock price can be
benecial external monitoring based on stock price information can restrain value-destroying
investments. In this latter case, stock market development contributes positively to economic
e¢ ciency (Holmström and Tirole, 1993).7
The previous literature has shown a positive correlation between stock market returns and
subsequent corporate investment in both the time series and the cross section (Fama, 1981;
Barro, 1990; and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990). But this is uninformative about causality.
Stock prices could just passively reect changing investment opportunities and the respective
investment decisions suggesting that corporate investment e¢ ciency does not depend on stock
prices. An opposing market-centric viewof capital allocation sees stock prices as crucial for
the external monitoring of the investment process. The latter view is predicated on a causal
stock price e¤ect on investment.8
6See Stein (2003) for a review of the e¤ect of agency conicts on corporate investment.
7See Dow and Gorton (1997) for a discussion about the relation of nancial market e¢ ciency and economic
e¢ ciency.
8For a theoretical analysis on the role of stock listings (and market liquidity) see, for example, Holmström
and Tirole (1993).
3
To explore causality, previous work focused on the e¤ect of asset mispricing on investment.
The extant literature employs rm-level mispricing proxies to show that the sensitivity of
investment to stock mispricing varies in the cross section according to certain rm characteristics.
In particular, small equity-dependent rms are found to reveal much stronger investment
sensitivity to mispricing measures such as Tobins q (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003), and
opaque rms with high R&D intensity are shown to have a higher investment sensitivity with
respect to a mispricing measure based on discretionary accruals (Polk and Sapienza, 2009). But
these mispricing measures are noisy proxies and their measurement errors correlate with the
correct valuation. Hence, one should expect to nd di¤erent investment sensitivities whenever
rm characteristics also drive both investment and the correct stock valuation. For example,
cross-sectional di¤erences in the severity of agency problems could imply that small rms
react faster to new investment opportunities. This should generate di¤erences in investment
sensitivities to Tobins q even in the absence of any mispricing or any causal e¤ect of stock
mispricing on investment. Similarly, discretionary accruals could occur in rms for which
investment is per se more reactive to new investment opportunities. These considerations show
that convincing evidence for a causal link between stock valuation and investment depends on
truly exogenous identication of mispricing such that measurement errors are uncorrelated with
particular rm characteristics. This paper provides such an identication by using fund-level
investment information su¢ ciently exogenous to the corporate investment process and agency
problems.
Another research strategy consists in directly confronting the measurement problem with
respect to Tobins q. Bakke and Whited (2010) develop an errors-in-variables model that
allows investment sensitivity to depend on a trueq observable only to managers. Here, the
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authors nd no evidence that investment responds to the non-fundamental error component
in q. But even their generalized framework must assume that the error in the measurable
q is independent of other unobservable rm characteristics that might also inuence a rms
investment share. Goyal and Yamada (2004) decompose Tobins q into a rm-specic and a
nonfundamental component during the 19871990 Japanese stock market boom and nd that
the latter strongly correlates with investment.9 But their identication of the nonfundamental
q is based on regression residuals that might still comprise unobservable components of the
fundamental valuation. Moreover, (macroeconomic) xed time e¤ects (such as the general
market exuberance) might inuence both the investment and the stock price process without
a causal e¤ect of the latter on the former.
The identication strategy in our paper is related to Gao and Lou (2011), who use price
pressure resulting from mutual fund owinduced trading to identify equity mispricing. They
show that equity overvaluations lead to more investment (as well as equity and debt issuance),
particularly for the nancially most constrained rms. Important for the authorsidentication
is that fund ows are exogenous and not determined by investor expectations regarding the
return prospects of individual rms held by the fund. By contrast, our identication strategy
is not based on fund ows, but on a negative return shock to a particular component of the
fund portfolio. This constitutes an even more solid identication strategy as it provides a clear
explanation as to why the fund outows occur.
Our analysis is related to the recent work by Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) and Grullon,
Michenaud, and Weston (2011). Chen et al. nd evidence that rm managers extract from
stock prices the private information that they do not already know and incorporate it into
9See also Chirinko and Schaller (1996, 2001).
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their investment decisions. Grullon et al. examine an exogenous event of SECs removal of
the uptick rule in 2005 and show that the removal leads to a decrease in equity issuance and
corporate investment for the a¤ected rms, particularly for nancially constrained rms. Our
nding also echoes the recent evidence advanced by Edmans, Goldstein, and Jiang (2012) on
the disciplinary role of the stock market. Specically, they nd that stock price discounts for
reasons unrelated to rm fundamentals trigger takeover threats for the discounted rms. We
nd a similar monitoring role of stock prices but via an independent event of the recent nancial
crisis. Our study is also related to Hau and Lai (2012), who examine the propagation of the
2007-2009 nancial crisis from nancial stocks to nonnancial stocks. They identify distressed
fund ownership as well as retail investor behavior as important channels of crisis transmission
and nd large temporary price discount for nonnancial stocks during the crisis. The current
study di¤ers in its focus on the real e¤ects of such stock underpricing on corporate investment
and employment.
The 20072009 crisis provides a new research opportunity to reach a better understanding of
the transmission channels from nancial to real activities. Using survey-based data, Campello,
Graham, and Harvey (2010) and Campello et al. (2011, 2012) show that nancially constrained
rms, especially those without access to credit lines, planned more cuts in their capital spending
and employment than other rms. Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) show that corporate
investment declined signicantly following the crisis for rms with low internal and external
capital. Almeida et al. (2012) identify rms whose long-term debt was mostly maturing right
after the third quarter of 2007 and show that these rms reduced their investment substantially
afterward. The contribution of our paper is to show that a stock market crash by itself has
a causal e¤ect on the real investment. Firms with relatively more depressed stock prices due
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to fund re sales during the crisis are particularly negatively impacted in their investment and
employment. In particular, relative to all other nancially constrained rms, those constrained
rms whose stock prices are severely underpriced have a roughly 26% lower investment share
at the peak of the crisis.
The following section discusses our identication strategy for equity mispricing during the
nancial crisis. Section 3 presents evidence for the real e¤ects of such mispricing. Section
4 discusses the role of rms external nancial constraints for the e¤ect of stock prices on
investment, followed by concluding remarks in Section 5.
2 Stock price e¤ects of fund re sales
The stock markets tendency toward e¢ ciency implies that cases of economically large stock
mispricing tend to be exceptional. In this paper, we identify such an exceptional event based on
re sales by distressed equity funds over the 20072009 nancial crisis. For individual stocks,
re sales by equity funds have been shown to imply relatively large transitory price e¤ects (Coval
and Sta¤ord, 2007). Hau and Lai (2012), in particular, show that re sales by distressed equity
funds in the recent crisis generated extremely large stock underpricing: Roughly one-third of all
US stocks were subject to re sales by equity funds and these stocks were underpriced relative
to industry peers by 37% on average. Transitory underpricing relative to industry peers is
particularly pronounced for stocks with above-median performance during the crisis because
distressed funds tended to sell their best-performing stocks. The 20072009 nancial crisis,
therefore, serves as an event study in which a large scale of relative stock underpricing can be
clearly identied.
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2.1 Measuring re sale exposure
To measure re sale exposure for nonnancial stocks via their fund owners, we use the
Thomson Reuters global mutual fund database. The database accounts for pure equity funds
as well as the equity holdings of balanced funds that also hold other assets such as bonds. In
the latter case only the equity portion of the fund holdings is reported. Most international
funds outside the US report only at six-month intervals hence our analysis is carried out at
a semiannual frequency. For funds with multiple reporting dates within a semester, we retain
only the last reporting date.
Our analysis discards highly concentrated fund holdings with fewer than ve stock positions
in a semester. Based on this lter, we obtain a sample of 27,274 mutual funds with equity
investments in 25 developed and 54 emerging markets over 20072009. A total of 6,327 funds
are domiciled in the US, 16,667 are located in other developed markets, and 4,280 are from
emerging markets. The number of funds reporting in each semester is uneven. In June 2007,
the data cover a total of 20,477 funds reporting stock positions with a combined total net equity
value of $9.7 trillion.10
In the rst step, we calculate the return shortfall called fund exposure(Expf) for all
equity funds worldwide based on their portfolio positions in nancial stocks from July 2007 to
June 2008. Specically, fund exposure is dened as a funds overall return from bank stock
investments below the  1% return threshold.11 With more than 1% of return loss, funds
10Our data coverage is therefore comparable to the Lionshares database used by Cremers et al. (2011), who
reported total net equity assets of $7:97 trillion for December 2007. Less than half of the reported equity
holdings in our sample concern US domiciled funds. In addition, 16,710 (or 82%) of all mutual funds hold at
least one foreign stock and can, therefore, be classied as international funds. The corresponding gure (73%)
is somewhat smaller for US domiciled funds. See also Ferreira et al. (2012).
11For robustness, we have also tried alternative return thresholds at 0% and -2%. The results remain
qualitatively similar.
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could face more investor scrutiny and large fund redemptions such that fund re sales become
important. A fund exposure of  15% implies that a fund su¤ered a decrease of 15% in its total
equity return over the 12-month period due to portfolio positions in bank stocks. The fund
exposure measure identies funds most likely to face strong investor redemptions because of
overinvestment in under-performing nancial stocks. The one-year period prior to the Lehman
collapse coincides with the dramatic decline of many bank stocks because of their exposure to
the subprime market. Table 1 shows that the mean (median) fund exposure to nancial stocks
(i.e., return loss due to bank investment) is  1:19% ( 1:12%).
[Insert Table 1 near here]
In the second step, fund exposure is aggregated to a stock-specic measure of stock
exposure(Exps) for all nonnancial US stocks.12 We dene stock exposure as the value-weighted
average fund exposure of all funds holding equity shares in a stock. The value weights are
measured relative to the stocks total market capitalization. Formally, stock exposure for stock





where !s(f) denotes the holdings of fund f in stock s relative to the aggregate holdings of all
funds in the stock, and Fshs denotes the fund share,dened as the aggregate fund holdings
in stock s relative to its shares outstanding. Both the holding weights !s(f) and the fund
share Fshs are measured at the end of June 2007. A high stock exposure Exps implies that a
12The focus on US stocks is justied because our holdings data are most complete for US stocks. In addition,
the fund re sales e¤ect is most pronounced in the US due to the generally large share of stock ownership by
equity funds. For a clean identication of nonnancial stocks, we use the Compustat industry segment le and
exclude from the sample all conglomerates that have nance divisions accounting for more than 1% of total
sales.
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relatively large proportion of a stocks capitalization is owned by equity funds with high fund
exposure to banking stocks. Such stocks, therefore, face the largest selling pressure if fund
exposure captures the need for re sales by individual funds.
Summary statistics on stock exposure of US nonnancial stocks are reported in Table 1.
The mean (median) stock exposure is  0:249 ( 0:181) pp, with large negative skewness of
 2:0. The 25%, 10%, and 5% most negative stock exposure quantiles are, respectively,  0:35,
 0:46, and  0:56 pp. For example, a stock exposure of  0:35 pp is obtained if 10% of a stocks
capitalization is owned by funds that on average lost 3:5 pps in their portfolio returns due to
nancial stock investments. The most negative values for stock exposure are obtained for stocks
with fund owners who su¤er the largest losses in bank stock investments and together own a
large share of the stocks market capitalization; the upper bound is zero if none of a stocks
fund owners su¤ers a portfolio return loss of more than 1% in bank stock investments. The
relation between re sale discounts and stock exposure might not be linear; hence, we dene
a squared stock exposure measure, (Exps)2, for inclusion in the regression analysis. Another
parsimonious way of capturing nonlinear e¤ects consists in dening an exposure dummyDExps
that marks the 33% of US stocks with the highest stock exposure. The regression coe¢ cient for
the exposure dummy conveniently summarizes the average re sale discount within the most
exposed stock tercile.
An alternative denition of fund distress could use fund outows directly as an identifying
measure. However, in this case, fund outows could simply reect a funds portfolio choice and,
therefore, become endogenous. For example, a high beta fund is likely to under-perform during
a nancial crisis, experience larger fund outows, and sell predominantly high beta stocks so
that the re sale price e¤ect becomes entangled with a possible increase in stock risk premiums.
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Fund outows could also be driven by a few investorsforesight about the future performance
of a fund. In this case, outows correlate with future stock under-performance and, therefore,
the re sale e¤ect becomes entangled with a confounding selection e¤ect. We argue that the
identication strategy we propose in this paper represents a more exogenous measure than fund
outows.
However, fund exposure to nancial stocks (as dened above) should be highly correlated
with fund outows. To show this, we dene as exposed fundsthe 33% of funds that had the
largest losses from holding nancial stocks. The rest of the funds are dened as nonexposed.
For 8,250 funds we are able to match the fund identity in the Thomson database to the
Lipper database, which provides complementary data on the exact fund returns and fund
size to estimate monthly investor redemption. We excluded the 2% of funds with extreme
monthly net ows because of concerns about reporting errors. Fig. 1 shows the average
cumulative net subscription from July 2007 through December 2009 separately for exposed
and nonexposed funds. Exposed funds experience net investor outows after September 2007,
which accumulated to a sizable average fund outow of more than 7% in March 2009. By
contrast, for nonexposed funds the average net cumulative inow remains positive over the full
30-month period and climbs to 12% at the end of 2009.
[Insert Figure 1 near here]
2.2 Fire sale e¤ects by return quantiles
Fund managers have considerable discretion over which stocks to sell to meet investor
redemptions. Three reasons suggest that their re sale behavior could condition on the recent
performance of a stock: (1) If stock prices generally deviate away from their fundamental values
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during a crisis, fund managers could choose to rst sell stocks with the highest realized crisis
returns; (2) fund managers could su¤er from the behavior bias commonly referred to as the
disposition e¤ect, which makes them averse to loss taking(Frazzini, 2006); and (3) investor
tax management considerations could motivate fund managers to realize capital gains during
market downturns when capital losses are abundant from elsewhere for their fund investors. To
capture the possible concentration of fund re sales in the tails of the stock return distribution,
we run quantile regressions that capture the e¤ect of stock exposure for di¤erent quantiles of
the (cumulative) stock return distribution.
Wemeasure stock returns as risk-adjusted cumulative excess returns rExs (k) over k consecutive
weeks since June 29, 2007. The risk adjustment of returns is based on the international
version of the four-factor Carhart model, estimated on pre-crisis data from July 2002 to June
2007. The four domestic factors and four international factors each consist of the market, size,
book-to-market, and momentum factors. During the crisis period, the market and HML risk
premiums were highly negative in the US For rms with positive loadings on these two factors,
the factor model produces highly negative benchmark returns. Because the risk-adjusted excess
returns represent di¤erences to these low benchmark returns, some cumulative risk-adjusted
excess returns appear large even though raw returns of the rms are much more modest. A
detailed description of the excess return calculation is provided in Appendix A. Alternative risk
adjustment based, for example, on domestic risk factors produces qualitatively similar results.
Next, we present quantile regressions, in which the cumulative risk-adjusted excess returns
rExs (k) of all nonnancial stocks are regressed on the dummy DExp
s; which marks the 33% of
US stocks with the highest ownership share by distressed equity funds;
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s + s: (2)
The regression controls for a stocks fund share Fshs (aggregate fund ownership relative to stock
capitalization) and also includes industry xed e¤ects. Controlling for fund share captures the
holding bias of equity funds toward larger and more liquid stocks. That is, any stock return
di¤erences pertaining to general investment biases of equity funds are captured by the fund
share variable. The coe¢ cient k1 captures the re sale e¤ect for the 33% most exposed stocks
relative to nonexposed stocks in the same industry.
[Insert Figure 2 near here]
Fig. 2, Panel A plots the evolution of the coe¢ cient k1 in Eq. (2) for each week of the
nancial crisis at the 50% quantile of risk-adjusted cumulative excess returns; Panel B plots
the same evolution at the 75% quantile; Panel C at the 90% quantile; and Panel D at the
95% quantile. Vertical bars around the main line indicate a condence interval of 2 standard
deviations around the point estimate. Exposed stocks with median return performance (Panel
A) show no discernible evidence for a discount relative to nonexposed stocks. At the 75%
quantile of better-performing stocks, the exposure discount is economically and statistically
signicant and peaks at  27 pps in February 2009. At the 90% and 95% quantile of the
best-performing stocks, the re sale discount reaches a large 70 pps and 144 pps, respectively,
before reverting in the spring of 2009. No statistically signicant e¤ects are found for lower
performance quantiles.
The re sale discount in the right tail of the return distribution can be further explored
in a cross-sectional analysis that focuses on the peak of the discounts at the end of February
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2009. For this particular date, we repeat the quantile regression in Eq. (2) over the entire
range of quantiles from 0:05 to 0:95. Fig. 3 plots for each quantile the xed e¤ect k0; which
captures the return performance for nonexposed stocks (dashed line), and the corresponding
xed e¤ect k0 + 
k
1 for exposed stocks (solid line), where 
k
1 represents the quantile-specic
cumulative risk-adjusted excess return wedge between exposed and nonexposed stocks due to
re sale discounts. The graph shows that the discount e¤ect of stock exposure is concentrated
among the best performing stocks in the right tail of the cumulative risk-adjusted excess return
distribution. As argued by Hau and Lai (2012), distressed equity funds avoided loss realization
implicit in selling under-performing stocks and instead liquidated the best-performing stocks
to nance investor redemptions.
[Insert Figure 3 near here]
2.3 Fire sale e¤ects and stock exposure
Next, we undertake a more detailed analysis of re sale discounts and stock exposure. Again,
we focus on the cross section of cumulative crisis returns but now examine the discount as a
function of the continuous exposure measure Exps: We also allow for a nonlinear (quadratic)
e¤ect of stock exposure by including the squared value (Exps)2 in the regression specication.
For example, a nonlinear e¤ect could result from an endogenous response of fund managers.
They could restrict further asset sales in stocks that have already experienced strong re
sale discounts, which should produce a convex relation between stock exposure and re sale
discounts. As shown in the previous section, re sale discounts are concentrated among the
50% best-performing stocks. Therefore, we interact the exposure measures with a high return
dummy DHighR(t) marking the 50% of stocks with the highest risk-adjusted excess return
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from the beginning of 2007/3 to the end of quarter t  1:
Table 2 reports a separate OLS regression for each quarter of cumulative risk-adjusted
excess returns rExs (t), measured from the beginning of 2007/3 to the end of quarter t =
2007=3; :::; 2009=4: For comparison purposes, we also include regression outcomes for the two
pre-crisis quarters, 2007=1 and 2007=2: Panel A reports the coe¢ cient estimates for the continuous
stock exposure measure Exps and its squared value (Exps)2, as well as their interactions with
the high return dummy






s)2 + t3DHighR(t) + (3)
+t4[Exp
s DHighR(t)] + t5[(Exps)2 DHighR(t)] + t6Fshs + s:
The regression includes industry xed e¤ects based on four-digit SIC codes so that the inuence
of macroeconomic crisis at the industry level is purged from the return regression. The
coe¢ cients for ExpsDHighR(t) and (Exps)2DHighR(t) are highly signicant for all crisis
quarters with a positive sign for both the linear term and the quadratic term. This implies a
convex relation between stock exposure Exps and re sale discounts among high return stocks.
In line with the evidence from the quantile regression, the coe¢ cient for Exps  DHighR(t)
peaks in 2009/1 and then declines again. For stocks with below median performance, we nd
at best a weak re sale discount.
[Insert Table 2 near here]
Table 2, Panel B reports a more parsimonious OLS regression. The two continuous exposure
variables Exps and (Exps)2 are replaced with the exposure dummy, DExps, used previously in
the quantile regressions. The regression
15






s DHighR(t)] + t3Fshs + s (4)
again includes industry xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient for the interaction termDExpsDHighR(t)
indicates the re sale discount for the 33% most exposed above-median performance stocks.
The average re sale discount peaks at around 60 pps in 2008/4 and 2009/1 before stock prices
revert again. The high statistical and economic signicance of stock underpricing captured by
the interaction term DExpsDHighR(t) should make the term a good instrument to explore
the causal e¤ect of underpricing on investment and employment. Next we discuss related
endogeneity issues and justify this instrument choice.
2.4 Identication issues and endogeneity
Our identication of causal investment and employment e¤ects due to stock underpricing is
based on the interaction term DExpsDHighR(t) composed of the high exposure dummy and
the high return dummy. For a clear discussion of potential problems with this identication
strategy, it is useful to highlight three separate dimensions in which a funds portfolio choice
could be endogenous. First, all funds exhibit common investment biases toward larger and
more liquid stocks. Second, exposed funds pick high return stocks for their re sales [which we
mark by the dummy DHighR(t)], and they could furthermore choose particular high return
stocks for sales. Third, exposed funds (with large investments in under-performing bank stocks)
could di¤er from nonexposed funds in their selection of nonnancial stocks and cluster their
portfolios in a subsample of stocks exposed to omitted risk factors. Next, we discuss each of
the three issues in turn.
A general investment bias of all funds toward particular stock types means only that
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the causal e¤ect should also concentrate in stocks with higher fund ownership. Given the
observability of the fund share in all stocks, we are able to control for general fund investment
biases.13
The endogenous fund choice of high return stocks for re sales suggests that the interaction
term DExps  DHighR(t) could be subject to an endogenous selection e¤ect even if the
exposure dummy DExps is strictly exogenous. In particular, stocks with a fundamental value
change above the median can be pushed out of the high return subsample due to a strong re
sale e¤ect on their returns. Such endogenous median-crossing for some stocks can create an
attenuation bias for any investment regression using DExps  DHighR(t) as the identifying
regressor because exposed stocks with strong re sale e¤ects (and possibly the strongest investment
e¤ect) are more likely to drop out of the high return subsample. To gauge the importance
of such median-crossing for exposed stocks in our sample, we examine Fig. 3, which plots
the cumulative risk-adjusted excess returns separately for exposed and nonexposed stocks at
di¤erent stock performance quantiles, based on a sequence of quantile regressions over the entire
range [0:05; 0:95] of cumulative stock return quantiles. The graph shows that the cumulative
risk-adjusted excess returns of the median stocks, marked by a vertical line, are similar across
the two stock subsamples and that the re sale discount for exposed stocks becomes discernible
only at above the 60% quantile, suggesting that the median return cuto¤ we use to examine
the re sale e¤ect is low enough that the endogenous stock selection e¤ect is not likely to
bias the coe¢ cient estimate. It is important to note that any static di¤erence in investment
behavior between the high and low return subsamples is directly accounted for by the high
return dummy. In other words, under the null hypothesis that stock price discounts do not
13The respective robustness test is provided in Table 5.
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a¤ect investment, the level coe¢ cient for DHighR(t) should fully account for any investment
e¤ect specic to the high return sample. Our regression specications, therefore, always include
DHighR(t) as a separate control variable.
The third concern is about the potential clustering of stock picks by exposed funds on
a small subsample of stocks that are exposed to omitted risk factors. Such clustering would
contradict the identifying assumption that the selection of nonnancial stocks by exposed funds
is quasi-random. Exposed stocks could in turn inherit a (non-random) stock selection bias of
the exposed funds. By contrast, a low level of similarity in stock selection among exposed funds
would provide evidence that their stock picks are quasi-random. It is, therefore, instructive to
explore the similarity of portfolio choice in nonnancial stocks by exposed funds. A convenient
benchmark for portfolio similarity among pairs of exposed funds is the portfolio similarity
between pairs of exposed and nonexposed funds. Formally, for any pair of funds (f1; f2); we
dene their portfolio overlap (in nonnancial sector stocks) as the sum of the portfolio weights




min[ bwf1;s; bwf2;s]; (5)
where bwf1;s and bwf2;s represent the portfolio weights of a nonnancial stock s in funds f1 and
f2; respectively. Fig. 4 plots the portfolio overlap measures sorted by quantiles for all pairs
of exposed funds, all pairs of exposed and nonexposed funds, and all pairs of nonexposed
funds based on fund holdings in December 2006. All three overlap measures show considerable
independence of stock picks across funds. The average overlap between two exposed funds
is 7:3%; compared with 3:2% for a pair of exposed and nonexposed funds and 2:6% for two
nonexposed funds. While the stock selections among exposed funds shows a somewhat higher
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similarity than those between pairs of exposed and nonexposed funds, the similarity remains
economically small. Any two exposed funds di¤er on average in 92:7% of stock picks, suggesting
a limited scope of clustering on stocks with particular unobserved risk factors. On average,
32:6% of exposed fund pairs do not share a single stock. The relatively low portfolio overlap
among exposed funds suggests that their nonnancial stock selections are to a large extent
independent from each other and could be considered as quasi-random for the purpose of our
analysis.
[Insert Figure 4 near here]
Finally, we explore whether exposed funds (stocks) feature any abnormal returns prior to
the crisis relative to nonexposed funds (stocks). Such abnormal returns can indicate omitted
risk factors. Table 3 reports test statistics for abnormal return di¤erences between exposed and
nonexposed funds (Panel A) and between exposed and nonexposed stocks (Panel B). Using a
methodology employed by Fama and French (2010), we form an equal- (or asset value-) weighted
portfolio of nonnancial holdings for the 33% most exposed funds and a corresponding portfolio
for the remaining 67% of funds each month from January 2002 to December 2006.14 We also
form monthly portfolios of nonnancial, exposed stocks and nonnancial, nonexposed stocks
for the same pre-crisis period. We then test for the di¤erence in risk-adjusted excess returns
using four di¤erent factor models, allowing factor loadings to di¤er across the two types of
funds and stocks. We nd only insignicant return di¤erences after controlling for the standard
risk factors in the literature. This suggests that exposed stocks were not priced according to
14We exclude nancial rms as well as rms with more than 1% of sales in the nancial sector from a funds
semiannual holdings. The portfolio returns are estimated each month using the stock holdings at the beginning
of the semester.
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any omitted risk factor. Apparently, the market did not anticipate their exposure to re sales
during a banking crisis.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
3 Stock underpricing and its real e¤ects
The nancial crisis was characterized by a general decline in rm investment. We measure
the investment share as the capital expenditure reported in period t relative to the net capital
stock in period t   1. This share declined for US companies from a mean of 36:6 pps in 2007
to 31:6 pps in 2008 and to 20:2 pps in 2009. Median employment growth was 3:7, 0:0, and
 4:0 pps in the years 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. The analysis of the investment share
in Subsection 3.1 is based on quarterly data because capital expenditure is typically reported
at that frequency, whereas the rm-level employment data used in Subsection 3.2 are available
only at the annual frequency.
3.1 Quarterly investment outcomes
To quantify the e¤ect of stock undervaluation on investment, we rst use panel regressions
with the quarterly investment share as the dependent variable and the undervaluation proxy
DExps DHighR(t) as the explanatory variable:
Invst = 0 + 1[DExp
s DHighR(t)] + 2Xs + st: (6)
The coe¢ cient 1 measures the investment shortfall due to exogenous stock underpricing.
In the rst specication in Table 4, Column 1, we use industry xed e¤ects interacted with
time xed e¤ects to control for all macroeconomic e¤ects at the industry level. As additional
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control variables Xs; we include the exposure dummy DExps and the high return dummy
DHighR(t) as separate terms, and pre-crisis measures of Stock size (log of assets at the end
of 2006), Tobins q (in 2006), Cash flow (for 2006), and risk-adjusted Stock return (for
2006). We winsorize the 2% highest and lowest outliers for all accounting variables and 1%
for return variables. Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 1. Appendix
B provides detailed denitions of accounting variables used in the paper. The undervaluation
proxy DExps  DHighR(t) as shown in Eq. (6) is (individually) statistically insignicant
from 2007/1 to 2008/3. Around the peak of the underpricing of exposed stocks in 2008/4
and 2009/1, the coe¢ cient becomes negative with a signicance level of 1% before turning
statistically insignicant in the second part of 2009. The F -test rejects the hypothesis that all
four coe¢ cients for the quarters 2008/3 to 2009/2 are jointly zero with an F -value of 12:90.
We can, therefore, assert a negative investment e¤ect from stock underpricing for these four
quarters at a very high level of statistical signicance. The point estimate of  1:23 pps for
2008/4 represents an economically signicant investment shortfall of 20% relative to an already
depressed quarterly average investment of 6:17 pps in 2008/4. The corresponding investment
shortfall is 23% (=  1:08 pps = 4:61 pps) in 2009/1. The control variables have the expected
signs: Large rms feature a lower investment share, while the 2006 observations on Tobins
q, cash ow, and stock return correlate with higher rm investment. All standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the stock level. As a robustness check, we also allow for serial
correlation in the error structure with similar results for statistical signicance.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
A second specication in Table 4, Column 2, is based on stock xed e¤ects and separate time
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xed e¤ects. The stock xed e¤ects replace the four control variables. The point estimates for
the undervaluation e¤ect on investment are (individually) statistically signicant at the 4% level
for each of the ve quarters 2008/3 to 2009/3. The hypothesis of joint statistical insignicance
for all four quarters 2008/32009/2 can be rejected, with an F -value of 12:10: The reported
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the stock level. The economic signicance of
the investment shortfall is very similar to the rst specication; for 2008/4 (2009/1), the point
estimate of  0:89 pp ( 0:85 pp) is slightly smaller and represents a relative investment decrease
of  14% ( 18%): Overall, the regressions based on quarterly investment data provide strong
evidence that the undervaluation of stocks subject to equity fund re sales had a large adverse
e¤ect on the behavior of the rms themselves.
As an additional robustness test, we examine whether general investment biases of funds
(for example, toward larger and more liquid stocks) are of only minor inuence on these results.
In Table 5, Column 2, we add interaction terms of the fund share in each stock (Fshs) and
quarterly time xed e¤ects as control variables. The results for the investment shortfall for
2008/3 to 2009/2 remain very strong.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
3.2 Annual investment and employment outcomes
For a large cross section of companies, employment data are reported at the end of the year.
We, therefore, repeat the above regressions using both the annual investment and employment
data. The dependent variable in the employment equation is given by the percentage change
in the number of employees relative to the previous year.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
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Table 6, column (1), presents the OLS regression results in which the investment share and
employment change equations are estimated separately. We use the same pre-crisis controls as
in Table 4, Column 1 and include (as before) industry xed e¤ects interacted with time xed
e¤ects. Both the investment and the employment equations yield a statistically signicant
negative coe¢ cient for the undervaluation e¤ect in 2009, as shown in DExpsDHighR(2009):
The point estimate for the investment shortfall is  4:41 pps, which implies a change of  22%
relative to a mean investment share of 20:23 pps for all rms in 2009. The yearly investment
data, therefore, produce quantitatively similar results compared with the quarterly regressions
in Table 4. The point estimate for the employment change in rms with depressed stock prices
is  4:68 pps. The mean (median) employment change for all rms in 2009 is  3:78 pps ( 4:02
pps); hence, rms with depressed stock prices reduced employment by 124% (117%) more than
the average (median) rm in the sample.
We also estimate both equations simultaneously as seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR);
the regression coe¢ cients are reported in Table 6, Column 2. The point estimate for the relative
investment e¤ect in 2009 is  3:81 pps, slightly smaller than the corresponding OLS estimate
( 4:41 pps); the estimate for the employment e¤ect is  4:59 pps, also somewhat smaller than
the OLS coe¢ cient ( 4:68 pps). However, the simultaneous equation approach does not yield
any signicant reduction in the standard errors of the coe¢ cients. Under the SUR approach,
however, we can test the cross-equation restriction that both coe¢ cients for the undervaluation
e¤ect are jointly zero. Such a hypothesis is again rejected at the 4% level of signicance. The
Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis of independence for the residuals of the two
equations. Overall, the annual data show that the investment shortfall in 2009 for rms with
depressed stock prices is matched by a simultaneous employment reduction above the reduction
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experienced by industry peers.
4 Financial constraints and the transmission channel
4.1 Evidence from two subsamples
We can highlight two reasons that external nancing constraints could codetermine any
causal link between stock underpricing and the incremental reduction in investment and employment
shown in the previous subsections. First, equity matters as collateral. A large stock price decline
reduces the value of equity collateral and could, therefore, deter external investors in general
and banks in particular from providing new capital. Second, a declining stock price generally
sends out a negative signal about a rms investment opportunities. External investors might
not be able to trace stock underpricing to fund re sales and, therefore, misinterpret the re
saleinduced stock price signal by suspending the investment nance of underpriced rms. In
the absence of external nancing needs, rm management might just ignore the transitory
underpricing of rm equity and maintain its investment plan.
The nance literature has developed a variety of measures to evaluate rmnancing constraints,
including investmentcash ow sensitivities (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988), the Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) index of constraints (Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo, 2001), the Whited
and Wu index (Whited and Wu, 2006), and a variety of di¤erent sorting criteria based on
rm characteristics. Using detailed qualitative information from nancial lings, Hadlock and
Pierce (2010) subject these measures to a rigorous test and nd that only rm size and age are
robust (and su¢ ciently exogenous) measures of nancial constraints. We, therefore, focus here
on the Hadlock and Pierce AS index, which is based on both rm asset size and age. In the
following analysis, rms are considered as nancially constrained if they are in the top tercile
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of the index distribution and unconstrained if they are in the bottom tercile. As an alternative
sorting variable for nancial constraints we use book asset size, in which the bottom (top)
tercile, i.e., small (large) rms, is considered nancially constrained (unconstrained).
Table 7 repeats the panel regression for the quarterly investment share in Table 4 for the
nancially constrained and unconstrained subsamples. Columns 12 present the results based
on a Hadlock and Pierce index sort; Columns 34 present the corresponding results for a sort
based on rm size. Financially constrained rms show a much stronger investment shortfall
[as measured by the coe¢ cient of the dummy DExps  DHighR(t)] than an average rm
in the full sample reported in Table 4. For example, the re sale e¤ect in 2009/1 increases
fourfold from  0:865 (Table 4, Column 2) to  4:187 (Table 7, Column 1). By contrast, in
the nancially unconstrained sample, exposed high return rms do not feature any signicant
relative investment shortfall. The joint hypothesis that all coe¢ cients for DExpsDHighR(t)
are zero for the most relevant crisis quarters is strongly rejected for the subsample of nancially
constrained rms but not rejected for the subsample of unconstrained rms. The regression
results are very similar for the two alternative nancial constraint proxies.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
Fig. 5 uses the estimated coe¢ cients in Eq. (6) to provide a graphical illustration of the
di¤erential investment e¤ect between exposed and nonexposed high return stocks, separately
for the subsample of constrained and unconstrained rms. The nancially constrained rms
depicted in Panel A feature a higher pre-crisis investment share than the (generally larger)
nancially unconstrained rms in Panel B. The most notable feature in Panel A is the relatively
large investment decline for exposed stocks compared with nonexposed stocks the combined
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e¤ect of the coe¢ cients for DExpsDHighR(t) and DExps creates a wedge of roughly 2 pps
between the two groups of stocks after the second quarter of 2008. The total investment share
over the four quarters from 2008/3 to 2009/2 was 19:67 pps and 26:74 pps, respectively, for the
nancially constrained exposed and nonexposed rms. Thus, the yearly investment shortfall
for the exposed rms amounts to approximately 7 pps or a 26% lower investment share relative
to nonexposed rms. Such an incremental reduction in investment is economically signicant.
[Insert Figure 5 near here]
The nancially unconstrained rms in Panel B show no evidence of a statistically or economically
signicant investment shortfall for exposed stocks with stock underpricing. We conclude that
nancial constraints play a crucial role in the transmission of stock underpricing into real
investment e¤ects. Stock underpricing translates into real e¤ects for nancially constrained
rms, but not for nancially unconstrained rms.
4.2 Permanent valuation e¤ects
Any investment shortfall due to stock underpricing for nancially constrained rms should
have permanent valuation e¤ects on these rms because of their reduced capital stock and lower
employment and output. How large are such permanent valuation e¤ects?15
Financially constrained rms that are subject to re sales experience a cumulative investment
shortfall of 11 pps over the four quarters from 2008=3 to 2009=2 (Table 7). The employment
decrease induced by stock underpricing occurs only in 2009 and is approximately 5 pps (Table
6). We can calibrate the output e¤ect for 2009, based on a neoclassical production function with
15Fund re sales due to bank stock exposure are likely to represent only part of the crisis-related stock price
ine¢ ciencies. Due to lack of relevant information, our calibration ignores all other sources of stock mispricing
that are unrelated to fund re sales.
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a capital share of 1=3 and a labor share of 2=3, to be  7 pps [= (1=3) ( 11 pps)+(2=3) ( 5
pps)]: If we assume that 20% of the production costs are xed in the short run, and the
corporate prot margin is 10%, then the output decrease translates into a prot shortfall of
19:6 pps [= (0:8 + 0:2=0:1) ( 7 pps)].16 At an average price-to-earnings ratio of 16, the latter
estimate implies a permanent price e¤ect of  1:23 pps [= ( 19:6 pps) (1=16)].
This calibration ignores any long-run e¤ects due to strategic competition, in which delayed
investment by one rm could imply a permanent loss of competitiveness and market share.
Some of the small-growth rms in the nancially constrained sample could face such situations.
Therefore, the permanent valuation e¤ects can be much larger than the estimate we provided
earlier. But such a competitive gain of one rm at the expense of an investment-constrained
competitor amounts mostly to a value transfer, but not a macroeconomic welfare loss.
Overall, temporary stock underpricing caused by fund re sales distorted the capital and
labor allocation process during the 20082009 crisis. The permanent valuation e¤ect of stock
underpricing appears non-negligible among the nancially constrained rms in spite of the
transitory nature of the re sale itself.
5 Conclusions
Judgments on the role of nancial market development for economic e¢ ciency and growth
hinge on evidence that the nancial market plays a role in the capital allocation process.
Previous work has used stock mispricing as a way of inferring such a capital allocation role.
If the stock market matters in equilibrium, then it should also matter out of equilibrium
16The earning change can be approximated by dE=E = (1=m) [1  (1 m)] dR=R, in which m denotes
the prot margin,  denotes the share of variable costs, and dR=R represents the revenue change.
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when stock prices do not (fully) reect future investment opportunities. Instances of market
ine¢ ciency are, therefore, informative about the capital allocation role of the market.
However, the endogeneity of investment and its entanglement with both agency problems
and measurement errors of mispricing proxies often make inference problematic. Ideally, the
identication strategy for mispricing should rely on data unrelated to the investment problem
of a rm a standard not met by any work we know of. Our paper makes an important
contribution by using fund re sales as a truly exogenous source of identication: The treatment
e¤ect for stock underpricing is based on the re sale pressure of a rms distressed mutual fund
owners and is, therefore, removed from the rms investment problem.
We nd evidence that (re salebased) stock underpricing negatively a¤ects investment and
employment. The e¤ects are statistically and economically signicant; thus, we can deduce
an important capital allocation role for the stock price. Relative to industry peers, the most
underpriced stocks experience an investment shortfall of roughly 20% prior to their stock price
recovery and a relative annual employment decrease of 4:7 percentage points in 2009. We
further investigate the transmission channel through which stock underpricing matters. Using
the Hadlock and Pierce index of nancial constraints, we sort stocks into a top tercile of most
constrained rms and a bottom tercile of least constrained rms. The constrained rms feature
a large incremental investment shortfall when subject to re salerelated stock underpricing,
whereas unconstrained rms show no such relative investment shortfall.
The role of stock market development for economic e¢ ciency and growth has long been an
unresolved issue because of the econometric challenges of causal inference (Beck, 2009). The
evidence in this paper shows that stock prices codetermine corporate investment and do so
most strongly for rms dependent on external nance. For these rms, stock price information
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must represent an important input into the external monitoring process.
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Appendix A. Risk adjustment
Our analysis of the re sale e¤ects on stock prices rst removes risk premiums from the
return analysis. For this risk adjustment, we use the international version of the Carhart (1997)
four-factor model. For each country, we construct a domestic and an international version of
the four factors: The market factor (MKT ), the size factor (SMB), the book-to-market factor
(HML), and the momentum factor (MOM). The factor construction is based on monthly
stock returns in US dollars from Datastream over the ve-year period from July 2002 to June
2007.
A countrys international factors are calculated in the second step as the weighted average
of the respective domestic factors of all other countries, in which the weights are given by
the relative stock market capitalization of each foreign country at the beginning of the year.
The stock market capitalization data are obtained from the World Development Indicator. We
estimate the factor loadings of each stock on the four domestic and four international risk
factors (j = Dom; Int) using a regression over 60 months from July 2002 to June 2007,











t + s;t; (7)
where rs;t denotes a stocks monthly (cum dividend) return in US dollars net of the one-month
Treasury bill rate. For the pre-crisis period, July 2002 to June 2007, the average factor loadings
on the market, size, and value factors are positive. A negative average loading is found only for
the momentum factor. All eight factors have explanatory power for the cross-section of returns.
The observation that both domestic and international risk factors play an important role in the
pricing of stocks corroborates the recent evidence advanced by Eun, Lai, de Roon, and Zhang
(2010) on the risk-return trade-o¤ of investment by global investors.
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With the estimated factor loadings bi;j for monthly returns, the monthly expected return




b1;jMKT jt + b2;jSMBjt + b3;jHMLjt + b4;jMOM jt : (8)
The cumulative expected return over k weeks (since month t) follows as




(1 + ers;t+i); (9)
where m denotes the number of full months and n the number of weeks falling into the last
month m + 1: The cumulative risk-adjusted excess return of stock s over k weeks can be




(1 + wrs;t+i)  (1 + ers;t(k)): (10)








(1 + ers;t+i): (11)
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Appendix B. Accounting variable denitions
Inv(t): The ratio of capital expenditures in period t to the start-of-period net property,
plant, and equipment, multiplied by 100. [Compustat data item: 100capxyq(t)=ppentq(t 1)
for the quarterly data and 100 capx(t)=ppent(t  1) for the annual data.]
Emp(t): The ratio of the change in the number of employees over period t to the number of
employees at the start of the period, multiplied by 100. [Compustat data item: 100(emp(t) 
emp(t  1))=emp(t  1).]
Stock size: The natural logarithm of total book assets in millions of US dollars in 2006=4.
[Compustat data item: natural logarithm of atq.]
Tobins q: The ratio of the market value of assets to total book assets in 2006=4, in which
the numerator is dened as the sum of market equity and book assets less book equity, deferred
taxes, and investment tax credits. [Compustat data item: (prccq  cshoq + atq   ceqq  
txdbq)=atq.]
Cash ow : The ratio of income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization
in 2006 to the net property, plant, and equipment in 2005=4. [Compustat data item: (sum of
ibq and dpq over the four quarters of 2006)=ppentq in the fourth quarter of 2005.]
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Reported are summary statistics for all nonfinancial and nonutility stocks. Fund exposure, Expf , is measured by the
return loss of a fund due to ownership in financial stocks over the one-year period from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008. Stock
exposure, Exps, measures the average fund exposure of all funds owning a stock, and the weights are given by the ownership
share of a fund relative to the stock’s market capitalization. The squared stock exposure is denoted by (Exps)2. The dummy
variable DExps marks the 33% of stocks with fund owners most exposed to financial stocks. Fund share Fshs measures the
aggregate holdings of all funds in a stock relative to the stock’s market capitalization. The percentage investment share Inv(t)
in year or quarter t is defined as the capital expenditure in period t relative to the net property, plant, and equipment in
period t− 1, multiplied by 100. The percentage employment change ∆Emp(t) measures the percentage change in the number
of employees over year t relative to the number at the end of period t− 1. Summary statistics are also reported for exposure
measures interacted with the high return dummy DHighR(t) for t = 2009/1. The high return dummy DHighR(t) marks all
stocks with above median risk-adjusted excess returns from the beginning of quarter 2007/3 to the end of quarter t − 1. As
control variables, we use Stock size measured by the natural logarithm of total book assets in millions of US dollars in 2006,
Tobin’s q calculated for 2006, Cash flow defined as income in 2006 (before extraordinary items but with depreciation and
amortization) relative to net property, plant, and equipment at the end of 2005, and the (risk-adjusted) Stock return in 2006.
The detailed definitions of the accounting variables are available in Appendix B.
Variable Obs. Mean Median STD Min Max
Fund exposure measures
Expf 13, 369 −0.019 −0.012 0.026 −0.363 0.000
Stock exposure measures
Exps (×100) 3, 084 −0.249 −0.181 0.253 −2.261 0.000
(Exps)2 (×100)2 3, 084 0.126 0.033 0.283 0.000 5.112
DExps 3, 084 0.334 0.000 0.472 0.000 1.000
Fund ownership share
Fshs 3, 084 0.219 0.222 0.153 0.000 0.781
Percentage investment share
Inv(2007) 2, 861 36.630 25.038 37.235 2.611 197.740
Inv(2008) 2, 697 31.570 22.680 30.164 2.067 158.759
Inv(2009) 2, 541 20.232 14.829 18.176 0.805 86.987
Percentage employment change
∆Emp(2007) 2, 813 6.908 3.728 23.293 −44.715 93.185
∆Emp(2008) 2, 650 1.305 0.000 20.368 −48.339 73.268
∆Emp(2009) 2, 494 −3.784 −4.015 17.208 −47.907 53.011
Interacted stock exposure
Exps ×DHighR(2009/1) 2, 589 −0.151 0.000 0.235 −1.786 0.000
(Exps)2 ×DHighR(2009/1) 2, 589 0.078 0.000 0.210 0.000 3.189
DExps ×DHighR(2009/1) 2, 589 0.210 0.000 0.407 0.000 1.000
Control variables
Stock size (log of assets) 3, 015 5.908 5.849 1.949 2.150 10.787
Tobin’s q 3, 012 2.262 1.781 1.427 0.884 8.093
Cash flow 2, 504 −0.494 0.359 4.863 −24.147 7.857
Stock return(2006) 3, 084 0.000 −0.076 0.543 −0.872 2.813
Table 2
Cumulative risk-adjusted excess return effect of stock fire sales
Reported are separate (cross-sectional) OLS regressions of Eq. (3) and (4) for the cumulative risk-adjusted excess return
measured from the beginning of quarter 2007/3 to the end of quarter t = 2007/3, ..., 2009/4. For the two pre-crisis quarters
2007/1 and 2007/2, the dependent variable is given by the respective quarterly risk-adjusted return. In Panel A we report
fire sales discounts for the continuous stock exposure variable Exps and the squared stock exposure (Exps)2, as well as their
interactions with the high return dummy DHighR(t), marking stocks with above median cumulative risk-adjusted excess
return from the beginning of 2007/3 to the end of quarter t − 1. For quarters 2007/1, 2007/2, and 2007/3, DHighR(t) is
set equal to that in 2007/4. Panel B uses a high exposure dummy DExps marking the 33% of stocks with the highest stock
exposure. We include as control variables the high return dummy DHighR(t) and the fund share (Fshs) measuring the
ownership share of all reporting equity funds relative to stock capitalization. Also included are fixed effects for each industry.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Test of abnormal pre-crisis return difference
We test for abnormal return differences (α differences) prior to the crisis between exposed and nonexposed funds (Panel
A) and between exposed and nonexposed stocks (Panel B) using different multifactor models. Each month from January 2002
to December 2006, we form two (equal-weighted or asset value-weighted) portfolios composed of the nonfinancial portfolio
component of exposed and nonexposed funds (Panel A) or directly of all nonfinancial, exposed stocks and nonfinancial,
nonexposed stocks (Panel B). Differences in risk-adjusted returns between the two groups are estimated using the US one-
factor (market) model, the US four-factor model, the international two-factor model (US and international market factor),
or the international eight-factor model. The independant variables are monthly portfolio returns for both Panels A and B.
Column 1 reports the difference in regression intercept (α) for the two portfolios, Column 2 the associated standard deviation,
Column 3 the t-value, and Column 4 the adjusted R2 of the regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Abnormal pre-crisis return differences between exposed and nonexposed funds
Equal-weighted returns Diff. in α Std. Dev. T -value Adj. R2
US one-factor model 0.0004 0.0016 0.25 0.956
US four-factor model −0.0003 0.0012 −0.24 0.978
International two-factor model −0.0004 0.0016 −0.27 0.961
International eight-factor model −0.0015 0.0019 −0.79 0.979
Value-weighted returns Diff. in α Std. Dev. T -value Adj. R2
US one-factor model 0.0013 0.0015 0.86 0.960
US four-factor model 0.0000 0.0013 0.00 0.973
International two-factor model 0.0003 0.0015 0.18 0.964
International eight-factor model −0.0021 0.0020 −1.05 0.975
Panel B: Abnormal pre-crisis return differences between exposed and non-exposed stocks
Equal-weighted returns Diff. in α Std. Dev. T -value Adj. R2
US one-factor model −0.0008 0.0048 −0.16 0.772
US four-factor model −0.0016 0.0029 −0.56 0.932
International two-factor model −0.0007 0.0052 −0.13 0.774
International eight-factor model 0.0013 0.0038 0.35 0.952
Value-weighted returns Diff. in α Std. Dev. T -value Adj. R2
US one-factor model −0.0007 0.0030 −0.23 0.874
US four-factor model −0.0021 0.0020 −1.05 0.953
International two-factor model −0.0012 0.0032 −0.38 0.872
International eight-factor model −0.0058 0.0031 −1.88 0.954
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Table 4
Investment effect of fund ownership exposure
Reported are ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of Eq. (6) for the quarterly percentage investment share (capital
expenditure in quarter t relative to the net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of the quarter) over the three-year
period from 2007/1 to 2009/4. The exposure dummy DExps marks the 33% US stocks with the highest ownership exposure
to distressed equity funds. The exposure dummy is then interacted with a high return dummy DHighR(t), marking stocks
with above median cumulative risk-adjusted excess return from the beginning of 2007/3 to the end of quarter t − 1. For
quarters 2007/1, 2007/2, and 2007/3, DHighR(t) is set equal to that in 2007/4. Included as controls (but not reported) are
the interaction terms between the exposure dummy DExps and time fixed effects and also the interaction terms between the
high return dummy DHighR(t) and time fixed effects. Specification 1 uses industry fixed effects (given by four-digit SEC
codes), time fixed effects, and their interactions, as well as the (pre-crisis) control variables Stock size, Tobin’s q, Cash flow,
and Stock return as defined in Table 1. Specification 2 uses stock fixed effects and separate time fixed effects. We report
robust T -values adjusted for clustering at the stock level.
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
quarterly percentage
investment share Coefficient T -value Coefficient T -value
DExps ×DHighR(2007/1) 0.330 0.61 −0.107 −0.22
DExps ×DHighR(2007/2) 0.313 0.57 0.099 0.20
DExps ×DHighR(2007/3) 0.809 1.56 0.378 0.85
DExps ×DHighR(2007/4) 0.236 0.40 0.044 0.09
DExps ×DHighR(2008/1) −0.416 −0.82 −0.647 −1.64
DExps ×DHighR(2008/2) −0.579 −1.12 −0.612 −1.56
DExps ×DHighR(2008/3) −0.656 −1.26 −0.879 −2.19
DExps ×DHighR(2008/4) −1.228 −2.64 −0.893 −2.31
DExps ×DHighR(2009/1) −1.079 −2.89 −0.848 −2.51
DExps ×DHighR(2009/2) −1.004 −2.74 −0.735 −2.14
DExps ×DHighR(2009/3) −0.286 −0.78 −0.729 −2.01
DExps ×DHighR(2009/4) −0.011 −0.03 −0.281 −0.72
Stock size (log of assets) −0.180 −3.83
Tobin’s q 0.673 9.19
Cash flow 0.027 1.01
Stock return(2006) 0.748 4.23
Industry fixed effects yes no
Industry time fixed effects yes no
Stock fixed effects no yes
Time fixed effects yes yes
Obs 25, 580 26, 223
Adj. R2 0.165 0.438
F -statistic (p-value)
H0 : no effect 2008/1 to 2009/4 8.333 (0.00) 13.224 (0.00)
H0 : no effect 2008/3 to 2009/2 12.896 (0.00) 12.101 (0.00)
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Table 5
Robustness to fund share controls
The regressions in Table 4, Column 2 are repeated by controlling for fund share (Fshs) interacted with time fixed effects
for each quarter. Fshs measures the aggregate ownership of all reporting equity funds in stock s relative to the stock’s market
capitalization. The exposure dummy DExps marks the 33% US stocks with the highest ownership exposure to distressed
equity funds. The exposure dummy is then interacted with a high return dummy DHighR(t), marking stocks with above
median cumulative risk-adjusted excess return from the beginning of 2007/3 to the end of quarter t− 1. For quarters 2007/1,
2007/2, and 2007/3, DHighR(t) is set equal to that in 2007/4. Included as controls (but not reported) are the interaction
terms between the exposure dummy DExps and time fixed effects and also the interaction terms between the high return
dummy DHighR(t) and time fixed effects. Specification 1 uses stock fixed effects and time fixed effects as in Table 4, Column
2; Specification 2 adds the fund share interacted with time fixed effects as additional controls. The dependent variable of the
regressions is the quarterly percentage investment share (capital expenditure in quarter t relative to the net property, plant,
and equipment at the beginning of the quarter). We report robust T -values adjusted for clustering at the stock level.
Dependent variable: (1) (2)
quarterly percentage
Investment share Coefficient T -value Coefficient T -value
DExps ×DHighR(2007/1) −0.107 −0.22 −0.096 −0.19
DExps ×DHighR(2007/2) 0.099 0.20 0.162 0.34
DExps ×DHighR(2007/3) 0.378 0.85 0.379 0.86
DExps ×DHighR(2007/4) 0.044 0.09 0.059 0.12
DExps ×DHighR(2008/1) −0.647 −1.64 −0.609 −1.55
DExps ×DHighR(2008/2) −0.612 −1.56 −0.605 −1.54
DExps ×DHighR(2008/3) −0.879 −2.19 −0.906 −2.25
DExps ×DHighR(2008/4) −0.893 −2.31 −0.969 −2.49
DExps ×DHighR(2009/1) −0.848 −2.51 −0.914 −2.67
DExps ×DHighR(2009/2) −0.735 −2.14 −0.832 −2.41
DExps ×DHighR(2009/3) −0.729 −2.01 −0.845 −2.31
DExps ×DHighR(2009/4) −0.281 −0.72 −0.377 −0.95
Stock fixed effects yes yes
Time fixed effects yes yes
Time fixed effects × Fshs no yes
Obs 26, 223 25, 914
Adj. R2 0.438 0.439
F -statistic (p-value)
H0 : no effect 2008/1 to 2009/4 13.224 (0.00) 15.058 (0.00)
H0 : no effect 2008/3 to 2009/2 12.101 (0.00) 13.972 (0.00)
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Table 6
Investment and employment effect of fund ownership exposure
Reported are ordinary least square (OLS) regressions and seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) for the annual percentage
investment share (capital expenditure in year t relative to the net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of the
year) and the annual percentage employment change over the three-year period from 2007 to 2009. The exposure dummy
DExps marks the 33% US stocks with the highest ownership exposure to distressed equity funds. The exposure dummy is
then interacted with a high return dummy DHighR(t), marking stocks with above median cumulative risk-adjusted excess
return from July 2007 to the end of year t−1. The DHighR(t) dummy for 2007 is set equal to that for 2008. We include (pre-
crisis) control variables defined in Table 1. Included as additional controls (but not reported) are interaction terms between
the exposure dummy DExps and year fixed effects. Also included are fixed time effects for each year, fixed effects for each
industry, and the interaction of industry and fixed time effects. We report robust T -values adjusted for clustering at the stock
level. Under the SUR model, we examine two additional null hypotheses: The joint zero coefficient of DExps×DHighR(2009)
and the independence of the investment and employment equations. The latter is conducted based on the Breusch and Pagan
test. The F -statistics and p-values are reported.
(1) (2)
OLS SUR
Coefficient T -value Coefficient T -value
Equation 1: Annual percentage investment share
DHighR(2007) 1.223 0.54 1.223 0.86
DHighR(2008) 4.432 2.26 4.706 3.12
DHighR(2009) 5.214 4.37 4.865 2.74
DExps ×DHighR(2007) 1.345 0.46 1.297 0.57
DExps ×DHighR(2008) −0.583 −0.24 −0.979 −0.41
DExps ×DHighR(2009) −4.407 −2.94 −3.809 −1.44
Stock size (log of assets) −1.896 −6.21 −1.901 −7.96
Tobin’s q 5.098 9.41 5.100 17.75
Cash flow −0.003 −0.01 0.036 0.37
Stock return(2006) 5.279 4.22 5.254 7.02
Obs 6, 419 6, 240
Adj. R2 0.199 0.330
Equation 2: Annual percentage employment change
DHighR(2007) 4.865 3.33 4.852 4.84
DHighR(2008) 5.422 4.10 5.426 5.13
DHighR(2009) 5.587 5.14 5.389 4.34
DExps ×DHighR(2007) −1.820 −0.88 −1.829 −1.14
DExps ×DHighR(2008) 0.493 0.28 0.479 0.29
DExps ×DHighR(2009) −4.681 −3.50 −4.592 −2.48
Stock size (log of assets) 0.086 0.45 0.071 0.42
Tobin’s q 1.974 6.66 2.010 9.98
Cash flow 0.323 2.58 0.345 5.05
Stock return(2006) 5.042 6.33 5.115 9.74
Obs 6, 294 6, 240
Adj. R2 0.142 0.282
F -statistic (p-value)
H0 : no real effect in 2009 − 6.610 (0.04)
H0 : two equations are independent 615.437 (0.00)
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Table 7
Financial constraints as transmission channel
The stock fixed effect regression in Table 4 is examined separately for the top tercile (marked as financially constrained)
and the bottom tercile (marked as financially unconstrained) of firms sorted by the Hadlock and Pierce AS index, with the
results reported in Columns—2. In Columns 3—4, we sort firms by their book asset values (Size). Included in the regressions
(but not reported) are stock fixed effects and separate time fixed effects, as well as DExps and DHighR, each interacted
with all time dummies. The dependent variable of the regressions is the quarterly percentage investment share (capital
expenditure in quarter t relative to the net property, plant, and equipment at the beginning of the quarter). We report robust
T -values adjusted for clustering at the stock level. We also report the F -statistics and p-values testing for the joint effect of
2008/1—2009/4, the joint effect of 2008/3—2009/2, and the equality of coefficient for DExps ×DHighR(2009/1) between the
constrained and unconstrained firms.
Financial constraints sorted by
Dependent variable: Hadlock and Pierce Index Size
quarterly percentage (1) (2) (3) (4)
investment share Constr. firms Unconstr. firms Constr. firms Unconstr. firms
Coef. T -value Coef. T -value Coef. T -value Coef. T -value
DExps ×DHighR(2007/1) 0.267 0.10 0.532 0.85 0.436 0.16 0.489 0.77
DExps ×DHighR(2007/2) 0.427 0.17 −0.159 −0.23 0.833 0.35 −0.298 −0.43
DExps ×DHighR(2007/3) 2.373 1.22 −0.787 −1.45 2.334 1.25 −0.691 −1.26
DExps ×DHighR(2007/4) 0.215 0.10 −0.085 −0.11 0.204 0.10 0.087 0.11
DExps ×DHighR(2008/1) −0.548 −0.32 −0.342 −0.76 −0.625 −0.38 −0.334 −0.72
DExps ×DHighR(2008/2) −0.993 −0.60 −0.153 −0.30 −0.779 −0.50 −0.042 −0.08
DExps ×DHighR(2008/3) −2.533 −1.01 0.652 1.02 −2.617 −1.10 0.747 1.19
DExps ×DHighR(2008/4) −1.914 −1.46 −0.304 −0.61 −1.795 −1.42 −0.462 −0.92
DExps ×DHighR(2009/1) −4.187 −2.64 0.159 0.32 −4.076 −2.62 0.247 0.50
DExps ×DHighR(2009/2) −2.330 −1.42 −0.370 −0.86 −2.150 −1.33 −0.341 −0.79
DExps ×DHighR(2009/3) −1.937 −1.27 −0.242 −0.48 −1.876 −1.26 −0.092 −0.17
DExps ×DHighR(2009/4) −2.304 −1.20 −0.626 −1.13 −2.299 −1.26 −0.569 −1.05
Obs 7, 638 9, 209 7, 651 9, 210
Adj. R2 0.323 0.582 0.325 0.580
F -statistic (p-value) for multiple zero coefficients
H0 : no effect 2008/1 to 2009/4 4.656 (0.03) 0.349 (0.55) 4.463 (0.03) 0.169 (0.68)
H0 : no effect 2008/3 to 2009/2 4.974 (0.03) 0.011 (0.92) 4.828 (0.03) 0.021 (0.89)
F -statistic (p-value) for equal coefficients across constrained and unconstrained firms















































Average cumulative fund flows
Figure 1: Plotted are the average cumulative fund flows for the 33% of funds with the highest investment losses in financial
sector stocks (exposed funds) and the remaining 67% of funds (non-exposed funds). A fund’s cumulative fund flow is estimated









































































































































































































Panel D: Stocks at 95% quantile
Fire sale discount by stock return quantile
Figure 2: The graphs show the fire sale discounts [measured by the coefficient αk1 in Eq. (2)] for exposed stocks in different
cumulative risk-adjusted stock excess return quantiles measured over the period from June 29, 2007 to the end of each
subsequent week ending December 25, 2009. Panel A shows fire sale discounts for stocks at the 50% (median) cumulative
risk-adjusted excess return quantile and Panel B for the better-performing stocks at the 75% cumulative risk-adjusted excess
return quantile. In Panels C and D, we plot the fire sale discounts for exposed stocks at the highest 90% and 95% cumulative
risk-adjusted excess quantiles, respectively. Stock exposure is measured by ownership share of distressed equity funds in a
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Cumulative risk-adjusted return quantiles
Cumulative risk-adjusted returns
for exposed and nonexposed stocks
Figure 3: Plotted are the estimated cumulative risk-adjusted excess returns for exposed and non-exposed stocks during the
period from June 29, 2007 to February 27, 2009 based on quantile regressions for cumulative risk-adjusted excess return
quantiles from 0.05 to 0.95. The dashed line represents the fixed effect αk0 in the quantile regression using EQ. (2) and the
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Distribution of portfolio similarity in
nonfinancial dtocks
Figure 4: Plotted are the distributions of the shared portfolio weights [i.e., fund overlap as described in EQ. (5)] in nonfinancial
stocks for three different types of fund pairs: Pairs of two exposed funds, pairs of exposed and non-exposed funds, and pairs











































































Panel B: Unconstrained firms
Investment for different stock groups
Figure 5: Plotted are the quarterly percentage investment shares (capital expenditure in quarter t relative to the net property,
plant, and equipment at the beginning of the quarter) for the financially constrained firms (Panel A) and unconstrained firms
(Panel B) based on the fixed effect obtained from Table 7, Columns 1 and 2. The evolution of the investment share for stocks
with (without) fire sale exposure and above median cumulative risk-adjusted return is given by the solid (dashed) line marked
by crosses (circles).
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